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PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS: UTILITY OR
FUTILITY?
A REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF
CORRECTION*
Introduction
Attention has recently focused on the long delays which have
developed between a finding or plea of guilty and the sentencing of
the defendant in the criminal courts of New York City.' Delays in
sentencing of from two to five months or more exist in most New
York City courts. On August 17, 1973, 879 defendants who had
pleaded or been found guilty of crimes remained in New York City
jails awaiting sentencing.2 These defendants comprised 15 percent
of all inmates awaiting disposition in the criminal and supreme
courts and 24 percent of all inmates awaiting disposition in felony
cases.' Inevitably, these convicted but unsentenced inmates have
added substantially to the severe overcrowding in the city's deten* This article is based upon a report prepared under the direction of
Mary D. Pickman, A.B. Radcliffe College (1965), LLB. Columbia Univ.
(1968), by the staff of the Legal Advocate Program of the New York City
Board of Correction. The Board of Correction is an agency of the New York
City government existing pursuant to section 626 of the City Charter,
having as its powers and duties, inter alia, the preparation for submission
of studies and reports in regard to methods of promoting closer cooperation
of custodial, probation, and parole agencies of government. The chairman
of the Board of Correction is Robert B. McKay. The Legal Advocate Program analyzes court-related problems as they affect the institutions within
the Board's jurisdiction. The Board of Correction wishes to give particular
thanks to Carol Gerstl, a third-year student at New York University Law
School for her work in the preparation and writing of this article.
1. R. WITZTUM, THE UTILIZATION OF PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS IN KINGS
COUNTY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF MANDATORY PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS

FOR PLEA BARGAINED DISPOSITIONS

(1972) (a report submitted to the Presid-

ing Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, the
Counsel of the Mayor's Office, and the Criminal Justice Coordinating
Council) [hereinafter cited as WITZTUM REPORT].
2. N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CORRECTION, NUMBER OF CASES AWAITING DISPOSITION IN CRIMINAL AND SUPREME COURT (August 17, 1973).

3. Id.
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tion institutions.' Timely sentencing, if available, would have led
either to their release on probation or their transfer to less populated
state or city prisons. Instead, unsentenced inmates are required to
sit idly for months in crowded city jails, contributing to a marked
lessening of all inmates' respect for the criminal justice system and
impairing the ability of that system to serve the purposes for which
it was created.
The deleterious results of such delays are numerous, regardless of
final sentencing outcome, and involve areas of concern that extend
beyond the actual physical confines of the prisons themselves. With
respect to inmates not ultimately destined for jail, the time spent
awaiting sentence is doubly costly. When a defendant receives a
suspended sentence or is released on probation, the waiting period
constitutes needless imprisonment and imposes a large financial
burden upon the city, which must spend a substantial amount to
incarcerate each inmate.' The city and state also incur the additional expense of supporting the prisoner's dependents who, deprived of his income, are often forced on the welfare rolls. For inmates ultimately sentenced to terms of imprisonment, the time
served in detention counts toward the maximum sentence imposed
by the court.' However, since most do not serve out the maximum
sentence, but are released on parole, the time served is often irrelevant. Further, detained inmates are not offered the type of work or
the recreational and educational programs found in institutions for
sentenced inmates. Thus, the delay results in further alienation of
4. On August 21, 1973, there were 6,387 inmates detained in New York
City institutions awaiting disposition of their cases. N.Y.C. Dep't of
Correction, Daily Inmate Census, Aug. 21, 1973. The New York City detention population is expected to rise as a result of enforcement of the state's
stringent new drug law which went into effect September 1, 1973. The new
law requires mandatory life sentences for persons convicted of certain drug
offenses and substantially limits plea bargaining in such cases. See N.Y.
CRIM. PRO. LAW § 220.10 (McKinney Supp. 1973). The New York City
Department of Correction estimates that the detention population will
increase by 2,500-3,000 individuals by September 1, 1974.
5. The average daily cost per inmate as estimated by the New York
City Bureau of the Budget was $17 in 1972. Interview with Paul Dickstein,
Lead Planner for Justice, New York City Bureau of the Budget, in New
York City, July 12, 1973.
6. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(3) (McKinney 1967).
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those convicted of crimes, making rehabilitation correspondingly
more difficult, and adds to the inhuman overcrowding in the city's
detention facilities.
Although the "wrong"-the long delays between time of conviction and time of sentencing and the effects thereof-is thus readily
apparent, little progress has been made in righting it. These delays
in sentencing are directly attributable to the requirement of a presentence reports on almost all defendants prior to sentencing. The
volume of reports required together with present practices of compiling such reports combine to make such delays inevitable. Thus
the utility of the pre-sentence report must be examined with the
goal of proposing both short and long-term solutions to the difficulties this requirement poses.
Under New York law, a person found guilty of a felony cannot be
sentenced until a pre-sentence report is submitted to the sentencing
judge.7 While not mandatory in all misdemeanor convictions, the
report is required before certain enumerated sentences may be imposed, and may be requested by the judge in all other cases at his
discretion." Although sentencing must await receipt of the required
report, the statute provides that sentence must be pronounced without unreasonable delay However, no court has as yet defined the
line between reasonable and unreasonable delay."0
7. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 390.20(1) (McKinney 1971) reads: "Requirement for felonies. In any case where a person is convicted of a felony, the
court must order a pre-sentence investigation of the defendant and it may
not pronounce sentence until it has received a written report of such investigation."
8. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 391.20(2) (McKinney 1971) reads: "Requirement for misdemeanors. Where a person is convicted of a misdemeanor a
pre-sentence report is not required, but the court may not pronounce any
of the following sentences unless it has ordered a pre-sentence investigation
of the defendant and has received a written report thereof: (a) A sentence
of probation; (b) A reformatory or alternative local reformatory sentence
of imprisonment; (c) A sentence of imprisonment for a term in excess of
ninety days; (d) Consecutive sentences of imprisonment for terms aggregating more than ninety days."
9. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 380.30(1) (McKinney 1971) reads: "In general. Sentence must be pronounced without unreasonable delay."
10. See, e.g., People ex rel. Accurso v. McMann, 23 App. Div. 2d 936,
259 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1965) (a delay of three and a half months in
pronouncing sentence did not divest the court of jurisdiction); People v.
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Delays in the completion of pre-sentence reports are directly attributable to increases in the workload of the probation officers who
prepare the reports." The increased workload itself results from two
principal causes: 1) a substantial rise in the number of felony arrests
and convictions in the past three years 2 and 2) recent changes in
the state's substantive and procedural law. These changes have
placed added burdens on probation officers by increasing the categories of cases in which pre-sentence reports are required 3 and by
extending the mandatory periods of probation. These extensions,
Gibson, 39 App. Div. 2d 947, 333 N.Y.S.2d 104 (2d Dep't 1972) (delay of
one year neither extremely long nor unreasonable where probation department demonstrated that it was overburdened with cases and understaffed). Compare People ex rel. Weingard v. Casscles, 40 App. Div. 2d 530,
333 N.Y.S.2d 973 (2d Dep't 1972) (19 month delay neither unreasonable
nor a violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial) with People ex rel.
Harty v. Fay, 10 N.Y.2d 374, 179 N.E.2d 483, 223 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1961)
(court loses jurisdiction to sentence where sentence is deferred without
justifiable cause for five and a half years after conviction).
11. Probation officers perform two separate functions: investigation
and supervision. Pre-sentence investigations of supreme court (felony)
cases are conducted by three separate probation departments, one in each
of the New York City supreme court judicial districts. The first district
includes Manhattan and the Bronx, the second district consists of Kings
and Richmond, and the eleventh district covers Queens. Investigations of
criminal court (misdemeanor) cases are conducted by the New York City
Office of Probation. Effective Feb. 1, 1974, these four separate departments will be consolidated into one New York City Office of Probation.
12. Felony arrests rose from approximately 75,000 in 1969 to over
102,000 in 1971. In 1972, felony arrests dropped to 98,000; in the first six
months of 1973, there were approximately 45,000 such arrests in New York
City. There were 7,249 felony convictions in fiscal year 1969, and 12,841
felony convictions in fiscal year 1971. 1973 ADMIN. BD. OF THE JUDICIAL
CONF. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. ANN. REP. [hereinafter cited as THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE]. "In New York City. . . felony defendants get indicted at a
rate of 25,000 a year, while the disposition of such cases runs only to 20,000.
As of . . .January [1972] there was a backlog of 10,000 cases, and one
quarter of those kept in jail wait more than six months before their cases
are disposed of." Time, May 8, 1972, at 61. The increase in felony convictions alone has occasioned a concomitant twenty percent rise in presentence investigations and reports.
13. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 390.20 (McKinney 1971).
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 65.00(3)(a)-(d) (McKinney Supp. 1973). Under
the revised law, there is a mandatory five-year period of probation for all
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while not directly affecting the number of pre-sentence investigations required, did substantially increase the probation departments' overall workload, and correspondingly diminished the total
manpower available for pre-sentence investigations.
Working within restrictive budgetary limitations, the probation
departments have implemented various measures designed to counteract the effect of these statutory changes: staff has been increased, 5 the size of the caseload has been frozen," and volunteers
have been recruited to help process cases."
sentences of probation after conviction of a felony, a three-year period for
any misdemeanor carrying a possible prison term exceeding three months,
and a one year period for any misdemeanor carrying a possible term of less
than three months.
15. Staffing remains well below the level required to meet the maximum caseload standard promulgated by the State Department of Probation which is, at present, 132 pre-sentence investigations per year per probation officer in the Supreme Court Probation Departments and 385 cases
per year per officer in the Office of Probation. 1972 N.Y.C. OFFICE OF
3. It is suggested that
staffing requirements should not be projected, as they are now, on the
disproven assumption that the rise or fall in the level of one year's workload
will continue unchanged into the following year. Instead the number of
indictments filed should be the determining standard since this would
PROBATION AND SUP. CT. PROBATION DEP'T ANN. REP.

have direct correlation to the pre-sentence caseloads several months later.
For a study dealing with related administrative problems in the courts see

Miller, New York Group Produces 'Instant' Court Reforms, 61
REV.

NAT'L CIVIC

120 (1972).

16. See note 15 supra. The probation department has limited the
growth of this caseload by petitioning the court frequently to exercise its
discretionary power to discharge individuals from probation who have per-

formed satisfactorily on probation for periods of more than one year. See
N.Y. CRiM. PRO. LAW § 410.90 (McKinney 1971).
17. In August 1972, the Legal Advocate Program of the New York City
Board of Correction instituted such a volunteer program by recruiting
lawyers and law students to assist probation officers in the investigation
and preparation of reports. A first group of fifteen volunteers worked on
approximately fifty cases, gathering information on the defendants for
ultimate inclusion in pre-sentence reports. On the same day that the volunteers began working, the Probation and Parole Officers' Association of

Greater New York, Local 599, filed suit against the Board of Correction to
restrain the volunteer effort as an unfair labor practice. This petition was
subsequently dismissed. The volunteer program was suspended in Septem-

ber 1972 because the Department of Probation could not afford the super-
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The most significant response. occasioned by the Criminal Procedure Law's expansive pre-sentence report requirements, however,
has been an alteration in the form of the pre-sentence report itself.
The applicable statute defines the scope of the pre-sentence investigation and report in very broad terms.'8 Although it lists specific
areas of investigation, including the defendant's criminal history,
education, employment, family, and economic status, the statute
provides that the investigation may encompass any matter that the
probation department or the court deems relevant to the issue of
sentence. Traditionally the information generated by the investigation had been presented in the form of a long narrative case history. The preparation of this case history was found to be unduly
time consuming. Faced with an increasing caseload, and in an effort
to increase its output, the New York City Office of Probation
adopted a greatly simplified short-form report for misdemeanor
cases. 20 (Fig. 1)

visory time necessary to monitor the volunteers. See Morton v. New York
City Bd. of Correction, No. 18933-1972 (Sup. Ct., dismissed Sept. 13,
1972).

18. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW §§ 390.30(1), (2) (McKinney 1971) reads: "(1)
The investigation. The pre-sentence investigation consists of the gathering
of information with respect to the circumstances attending the commission
of the offense, the defendant's history of delinquency or criminality, and
the defendant's social history, employment history, family situation, economic status, education, and personal habits. Such investigation may also
include any other matter which the agency conducting the investigation
deems relevant to the question of sentence, and must include any matter
the court directs to be included. (2) Physical and mental examination.
Whenever information is available with respect to the defendant's physical and mental condition, the pre-sentence investigation must include
the gathering of such information. In the case of a felony or a Class A
misdemeanor or in any case where a person under the age of twenty-one
is convicted of a crime, the court may order that the defendant undergo a
thorough physical or mental examination in a designated facility and may
further order that the defendant remain in such facility for such purpose
for a period not exceeding thirty days."
19. Id.
20. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 390.30(4) (McKinney 1971) provides that
the short-form report may be used where the conviction is of a misdemeanor. The Kings County Probation Department has also adopted a
short-form report for cases in which a guilty plea to a misdemeanor is
accepted by the court. Such cases account for 37 percent of all guilty pleas

19731

PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS

It is not overly optimistic to suggest that the present aggravated
delays can be alleviated in the short-run through such measures as
have been taken." Yet, as long as the number of convictions continues to grow, these steps will not be adequate in dealing with the
problem of post-conviction delays. Moreover, neither the steps already taken nor those which might be envisioned, confront the fundamental problem-whether the report itself is necessary. It is essential to determine what benefits, if any, accrue to the defendant
and society from the pre-sentence investigation and report, and to
decide whether such benefits warrant continuation of the present
pre-sentence procedure in spite of its attendant problems.
Benefits of the Pre-Sentence Report
The goals of criminal law enforcement are generally ill-defined
and contradictory. They include retribution, deterrence, isolation of
offenders from society, and rehabilitation." It is for the sentencing
and verdicts in the supreme court of that county. However, the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has urged
that short-form pre-sentence reports only be used as a temporary step
when dictated by manpower and financial shortages. THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 19

(1967) [hereinafter cited as THE COURTS].

21. Implementation of the short-term measures described has significantly reduced the number of jailed defendants awaiting sentence. On
September 15, 1972, 1,460 defendants waited in New York City jails for
sentencing; as of August 17, 1973, that number had been reduced to 879.
Jailed defendants awaiting sentence on September 15, 1972, numbered
1,379; the corresponding figure for August 17, 1973, was 736.
22. See THE COURTS, supra note 20, at 14; Frankel, Lawlessness in
Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972). In the early period of this country's

history, prisons were used to house prisoners awaiting execution or some
form of public punishment. Though the methods of punishment were varied-whipping, the stocks, the ducking stool-the dominant theory was
that of retribution, with a certain element of deterrence inherent in the
public aspect of the punishment. The concept of imprisonment as a form
of punishment first took hold in the 18th century. Imprisonment was considered a humane development at that time, but was still based on a
retributive rather than rehabilitative concept. It was not until the 19th
century that the idea of reforming prisoners developed, and two separate
reformatory patterns were established. The "Pennsylvania" approach,
epitomized in the word "penitentiary," was rooted in the Quaker belief
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judge, within statutory limits, to determine which goal should take
precedence in a particular case. 3 In theory the pre-sentencing report, by individualizing the defendant and his case, assists the judge
in assessing what the deterrent, retributive or rehabilitative effect
on the defendant would be and thus helps him to select the appropriate sentence. Thus, pre-sentence investigations and reports
should result in sentences that are advantageous to both the individual offender and society.24 This justification for the pre-sentence
report requirement of course assumes a smoothly functioning criminal adjudicative system where sentence is not determined until after
the pre-sentence report has been received by the judge, and the
sentence is tailored to the individual needs of the defendant within
the limits set by law.
Assuming that it is to society's benefit to have as many offenders
as possible released under supervision rather than imprisoned, the
pre-sentence report is valuable in encouraging sentencing judges to
assume the risks involved in granting probation rather than imprisonment.25 Initially, a number of states required that a judge have
that criminals were corrupted by an evil society and could only be reformed
by a complete removal from that society. Accordingly, inmates were placed
alone in cells and denied any contact with the outside world or even with
other prisoners. In such isolation the inmate could contemplate his misdeeds, repent of his corruption, and so be reformed. On the other hand,
New York authorities believed that total isolation would ultimately lead
to insanity rather than rehabilitation. To mitigate the isolating effect of
individual cells they provided dining areas for the prisoners, although the
rule of silence remained in force until well into this century. In addition,
late in the 19th century, New York attempted to implement certain of the
reform proposals first advanced in 1870 by the National Prison Association. This reform group stressed the need for instilling self-respect in prisoners and tried to shift the emphasis of punishment from retribution to
rehabilitation. Facilities were built in Elmira and Great Meadow to house
young first offenders. However, after the rash of prisons riots which took
place during the 1920's, the emphasis in criminal law enforcement was
again laid upon secure detention as an end in itself, while the theorists
continued to pledge support to the goal of rehabilitation. See generally
ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE

NEW

YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION

(1972); R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA (1970); G. LEINWAND,
PRISONS (1972).
23. See THE COURTS, supra note 20, at 14.
24. S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 88 (1963).
25. A probationary sentence maintains the person in the society where
ON ATTICA
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access to a pre-sentence investigation and report before a sentence
of probation could be imposed. 6 Since the 1930's, the use of the
report has expanded to include various other sentences. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice found that the general absence of pre-sentence reports for misdemeanants contributed to the unwillingness of judges in many
cases to consider alternatives to imprisonment and was a major
cause of irrational sentencing. 7
The New York Experience
Section 65.00 of the New York Penal Law requires that certain
conditions must be present before a sentence of probation may be
granted.2" Since only a minimum amount of information relevant to
he must live and function. By so doing, the possibility for normal social
development is not interrupted by the traumatic break which institutionalization causes. "If we have learned anything about the correctional process, it is that many of the people sent to prisons would have had better
prospects of being restored to useful life if they were placed on probation
under close professional supervision, rather than confined. .

.

.[A] pro-

bationer can be given close supervision for less than one-tenth of what it
costs to keep the same person in prison." Burger, The Judiciary, 38 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 740, 742 (1972). "[T]he fact that four out of five
prison inmates are recidivists demonstrates the utter failure of the present
structure to achieve any correctional or rehabilitative potential ....
[Tihe startling increase in youthful criminality (while serious crime was
increasing dramatically during the 1960's, arrests of persons under 18 years
of age increased 90 percent, 15-17 year-olds being subject to more arrests
than any other age group) . ..[coupled with] the present rate of recidiv-

ism mandates a more vigorous attempt to prevent the initial involvement
of individuals in what is now a never-ending maze of criminality and
governmental retaliation." Clark, The Courts, the Police, and the
Community, 46 S.CAL. L. REV. 1, 6, 9 (1972).
26. See RUBIN, supra note 24, at 76-77.
27. See THE COURTS, supra note 20, at 78-79. In the federal system, for
example, the average length of prison sentences for narcotics violations in
1965 was 83 months in the tenth circuit, but only 44 months in the third
circuit. Id. at 23-24. For a discussion of disparity in sentencing, see Frankel, supra note 22.
28. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00(1) (McKinney 1967) reads: "1. Criteria.
The court may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction
of any crime other than a class A felony, if the court, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history, character and
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the issue of whether these conditions are met will be forthcoming
in a trial and even less will be disclosed if the defendant pleads
guilty, the information developed in the pre-sentence report is essential."9 In addition, the report provides judges with independent
verification of whatever background information has been provided
by the defense.
In May 1971, a committee appointed by the Presiding Justices of
the Appellate Divisions, First and Second Judicial Departments,
surveyed New York judges' attitudes toward pre-sentencing reports. :"' The Committee asked 131 judges to rank each of 17 elements
of the pre-sentence report as either "essential," "desirable but not
essential," or "of little or no value." 3 ' Each response commented on
the 17 categories of pre-sentence information, and, as Table I indicates, almost every item of information was considered essential by
an overwhelming majority of judges. On the basis of the survey, the
Committee concluded that: "the justices . . having failed to conclusively identify any items as being of "little or no value," all
should be retained. However, it was also agreed that "a greater
portion of the time expended . . . should be spent on [those] items
considered . . . to be 'Essential'."32 Assuming the survey accurately
reflects judicial attitudes,33 the results demonstrate that judges
condition of the defendant is of the opinion that: (a) Institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public;
(b) The defendant is in need of guidance, training or other assistance
which, in his case, can be effectively administered through probation supervision; and (c) Such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of
justice."
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07, Comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954)
wherein it is indicated that only information as to nature of crime will be
brought out at trial; information regarding the defendant's background
will not.
30. INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON PROBATION REPORTS, OF THE APP.
Div.,

1ST

&

2D DEP'TS

4 (1971).

31. Of the 65 supreme court justices and the 66 criminal court judges
polled, all responded.
32. INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. REPORTS, supra note 30, at 4.
33. The question might be asked how many judges, in responding to a
questionnaire prepared under the auspices of the Appellate Division,
would state that they did not consider the information provided in the presentence report to be essential since to do so might be taken as an indication that they were not giving full and careful consideration to the imposition of sentences.
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place considerable value on pre-sentence reports. This conclusion
presumably would include the more specific presumption that
judges considering sentences of probation rely substantially upon
pre-sentence reports. Sentences of probation have been imposed
more frequently when the judge awaits receipt of the pre-sentence
report than when the judge promises such a disposition during plea
bargaining. Such was found to be the case by a subsequent study
showing that probation is granted in 22.2 percent more cases when
sentencing follows receipt of the report rather than when sentence
is imposed without the report. 4
The assertion that pre-sentence reports are responsible for keeping defendants out of prison by making probation a more appropriate alternative to judges is, however, extremely difficult to prove.
As yet, no in-depth study has been made of sentencing patterns in
the criminal courts before and after the expanded use of these reports mandated by the new Criminal Procedure Law. 5 However, the
percentage of sentenced defendants placed on probation by the
criminal court has increased significantly since the law took effect
on September 1, 1971.36 While this change in sentencing patterns
might well be explained by other factors, it would seem to confirm
some of the conclusions about the usefulness of the reports drawn
by the Vera Institute of Justice during its Bronx Sentencing Project.37 That study, which predated the adoption of the Criminal
Procedure Law, was a response to the recommendations of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 6 It was designed to study the usefulness of pre-sentence reports
in the sentencing of misdemeanants 9 A special short-form report
was designed for misdemeanor offenders. It included a sentencing
See WITZTUM REPORT, supra note 1.
35. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
36. In August 1971, 571 individuals were placed on probation, comprising 6.8 percent of all those sentenced by the criminal court in that month.
34.

N.Y.C.

OFFICE OF PROBATION MON. REP.

(Aug. 1971). In January 1972, these

figures increased to 700 and 9.3 percent, respectively. Id. (Jan. 1972).
37.

J.

LIEBERMAN,

A.

SCHAFFER & J.

MARTIN, THE BRONX SENTENCING

PROJECT OF THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENT IN THE USE OF
SHORT-FORM PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS FOR ADULT MISDEMEANANTS

[hereinafter cited as SENTENCING REPORT].
38. See THE COURTS, supra note 20, at 18-19.

39.

See

SENTENCING REPORT,

supra note 37, at 3.

(1971)
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recommendation which was made available to the court prior to
sentencing in those cases where no report had previously been requested by the court.4" Some observations on the effect of the report
can be made, especially with regard to the imposition of probationary sentencing for legal aid clients. (Table II) In cases where no
report was ordered, legal aid clients were sentenced to prison at a
rate 57 percent greater than that of clients of private attorneys. In
"Vera Report" cases, 12 percent fewer legal aid clients received
prison sentences, and as a result, the gap between legal aid clients
and clients of private attorneys sentenced to prison was narrowed
to 34 percent.'
The results of the Vera pre-sentencing project strongly imply that
the pre-sentence investigation may help to correct inequities built
into the criminal justice system. However, generalizations drawn
from the results of the project are suspect since the sentencing project undertook an active referral role42 and was, in this respect,
totally different from the official pre-sentence investigations. In
many cases, this role led the project to request a six-month sentencing delay so that the convicted defendant could be placed in a
supervised release program. It is thus difficult to conclude whether
the project's impact on sentencing patterns is a result of the presentence report or the nature of the supervised release aspect of the
project which differs from that of the probation department.'
Pre-Sentence Reports and Guilty Pleas
While results in the foregoing studies reasonably support the
theory that pre-sentence investigations and reports may result in
more effective sentences, the pre-sentence report must be evaluated
within the context of the day-to-day operations of the city's criminal
40. Id. at 3a. No direct comparison was made between the sentence
imposed in cases where a "Vera Report" was prepared and those in which
there was no report at all.
41. Id. at 62.
42. This active referral role consisted of the project's developing ties
with community social service agencies and private employers who could
provide jobs. Therefore, when Vera completed its sentencing investigation,
it was able to refer the defendant to a job and to social service help and
could thus inform the court that, if not sentenced to jail, the defendant
had specific opportunities available to him.
43. SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 37, at 25-31.
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courts, where more than 95 percent of all findings of guilt are the
result of pleas by the defendant.4
Most discussions of the need for pre-sentence reports note that
even with a trial very little of the information needed for proper
sentencing will be presented in court.45 Where there is a guilty plea,
it is inevitable that little verified information relevant to sentencing
will be produced." Thus, the argument has been made that in cases
resulting in pleas of guilty, the pre-sentence report assumes even
greater importance in the sentencing process. However, this ignores
the fact that guilty pleas are usually obtained by a promise of a
reduced charge, with a correspondingly lower maximum sentence.47
It must therefore be asked whether the pre-sentence report can influence the sentence imposed if that sentence has already been
agreed upon before the investigation is begun. If the pre-sentence
report has in fact little or no effect on the actual sentence imposed,
the rationale for the whole system of pre-sentence investigations is
obviated.
For example, although a 79 percent correlation between sentence
recommendations and final dispositions (actual sentences) exists in
the Kings County (Brooklyn) Probation Department, a cause and
effect relationship is difficult to identify. Almost all of these reports are prepared in cases where the defendant pleaded guilty to a
charge other than that averred in the indictment. In many cases the
probation department is aware of the promised sentence before beginning its investigation. The correlation between the sentence recommendation of the probation department and final disposition
may represent no more than the probation department's acceptance
of the bargained-for sentence.
In order to gain a more definite idea of the relationship between
the sentence bargained for and the sentence recommended, the
44. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1972, at 41, col. 6. For a comparison with the
federal courts see Clark, supra note 25, at 5 wherein it is stated that:
"[A]pproximately 60 percent of all criminal prosecutions result in a guilty
plea, of the remainder only one third are convicted and less than 15 percent
of those are reversed." (footnotes omitted).
45. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07, Comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
47. Zimroth, Speedy Trials: What They Can and Cannot Accomplish,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 4.
48. See WITZTUM REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
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Witztum study" tested the following hypotheses: 1) when a sentence
promise had been made in return for a guilty plea, the pre-sentence
report would have little or no effect on the actual sentence imposed;
and 2) when the sentence promise was known to the probation officer before the report was completed, that knowledge would have a
direct, although perhaps subtle, effect on the officer's recommendation, making his agreement with the sentence promised more
likely."'
The study confirmed both hypotheses. In 209 cases where the
sentence promise was made prior to the report's writing, the probation recommendation clearly influenced the final sentence in only
7.7 percent of the cases.i In those cases, either the sentence imposed
followed the recommendation of the pre-sentence report, rather
than the sentence promised, or the guilty plea was withdrawn after
the pre-sentence report recommended a harsher sentence than had
originally been promised. In addition, where the sentence promise
was known, the probation department's recommendation and the
actual sentence imposed agreed in 14.8 percent more cases than
where a promise had not been made."
The report concludes that in the Kings County Supreme Court,
the pre-sentence report is not being used for the purposes originally
intended."3 Instead it suggests:
1. Where there is an understanding as to sentence as a part of the plea
bargaining process, the judge will honor that understanding. . . . 2. As a
general rule the judge does not make significant use of the pre-sentence
report when the plea bargain includes a sentence agreement. . . . 3. Where
an agreement as to sentence exists, the Probation officers will tend to make
an identical recommendation in the pre-sentence report, to support the judicial pre-disposition to honor the agrebment. . . . 4. Where a judge is considering release he will seek to avoid making a commitment as to sentence. ...
5. The Judges, in plea bargained cases, will primarily use the pre-sentence
4
reports to guard against mistaken decisions of release.

The report concluded:
The major findings suggest that, at least in Kings County, the value of the

Id.
Id.at
51. Id. at
52. Id. at
53. Id. at
54. Id. at
49.
50.

15-17.
18.
18-19.
2-3.
27-29.
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pre-sentence report as a tool for effective sentencing is limited. In all but a
few cases, the pre-sentence report seems to be largely superfluous, at best
verifying the judge's perceptions formed at the time the guilty plea is taken.
The City is bearing a major expense for little benefit. 5

The New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, its
Causes, Control, and Effect on Society in its 1971 report"6 asserts
very much the same conclusions:
Another reason for condemnation of the practice of sentence commitments
by a judge in advance of the entry of a plea is its nullification of a very
important component in the sentencing process, the probation report ....

The Committee's inquiry has disclosed that once the sentence commitment
has been made by a judge the probation report is subtly tailored to justify
the sentence. The original purpose of the probation report is thus distorted

to fit the exigency of having to keep the dispositions flowing.

7

The Committee also found that the distortion introduced by the
subtle tailoring of the pre-sentence report continues into the correction process itself, affecting the treatment accorded an inmate during the course of his prison term."
The report is used by a correctional facility as an initial source of
information as to the inmate's background and personality and as
a basis upon which decisions regarding job placement and program
assignment are made. It is entirely possible that it could be the
difference between assignment to a minimum, medium, or maximum security institution. The report is also reviewed by the parole
board in connection with its decision when to release the inmate.
Therefore as an important first step in the prison rehabilitative
process and in the determination of parole eligibility, it is vital that
the pre-sentence report be fairly and accurately prepared.
The foregoing discussion raises serious questions as to the overall
benefit of mandatory pre-sentence investigation and reports in the
majority of criminal cases in which such reports are presently required. While in theory the pre-sentence reports have obvious bene55.

Id. at 29.

56.

NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON CRIME,

CAUSES,

CONTROL AND EFFECT ON SOCIETY

(1971) [hereinafter cited

ITS
as

HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT].

57. Id. at 32. A case which recognized the danger of misinformation
created by tailored pre-sentence reports is Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736 (1948).
58. HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 56, at 32.
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fits for both the defendant and society in general, the reality of the
criminal court system may outweigh such theoretical benefits. If 95
percent of all convictions are gained through guilty pleas, and if in
over half of these cases the sentence is determined prior to any
investigation so that the report acts merely to confirm the already
negotiated sentence, the city is expending a great deal of money for
rubber stamps. If reports, prepared with an intention of conforming
to negotiated sentences, can determine the rehabilitative program
chosen for a prison inmate, has either the defendant or society
gained from the existence of the report? In light of these questions,
it is difficult to find clear justification for the legislature's action
increasing the categories of cases in which reports are required,
especially in light of the resultant delays in adjudication and the
overcrowding of detention facilities. In practice, therefore, the utility of the pre-sentence report sharply contrasts with its theoretical
benefits envisioned by the legislature and ascribed to by the judici-

ary. 59
Long-Range Solutions
The short-term solutions discussed earlier'" can reduce the delays
that now exist, but they do not address the problem of continued
growth in caseloads. More importantly, the short-term solutions
only allow for better administration of existing law and court procedures-and do nothing to answer the serious questions raised concerning the usefulness of the reports themselves. The present presentence process can only be evaluated in the context of the entire
criminal justice system, of which it is an integral part.' Specifically,
the effect of plea bargaining on the utility of pre-sentence reports
must be considered.
The state's criminal statutes postulate an adjudicative system
where the determination of guilt or innocence is based solely on
proof that the particular defendant did or did not commit a specific
crime. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty and
the determination of guilt or innocence is made at trial by jury. All
of the procedural and substantive rules developed by courts and
legislatures are premised on the theory of a fully functioning adjudi59.
60.
61.

See notes 23-24 and 28-34 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1972, at 40, col. 1.
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cative system and, therefore, present pre-sentence procedures reflect this theory. In fact, what exists is a dual system-the theory
of the laws and the reality of criminal case processing. The law does
not reflect the reality of a system, where less than 10 percent of all
felony defendants have the benefit of trials; where for many of the
95 percent who plead guilty62 the charge to which they plead is
meaningless and their only concern is in bargaining for a reduced
sentence; 61 where the judge takes part in the bargaining and then
insists that the defendant swear that he is actually guilty of the
charge, which by this time is any crime carrying the agreed-upon
sentence; where the defendant knows that if he insists on a trial and
is convicted, the sentence will be much heavier than that offered in
return for a guilty plea;64 where, in fact, guilt, innocence, the defendant, and the crime itself are of little importance-where "dispositions" are the goal. 5
To date, attempts to rationalize or reform the pre-sentence process have accepted the dichotomy between the criminal law as
printed and practiced. Chief Justice Burger's sound advice that
every piece of legislation creating new cases be accompanied by a
court impact statement to determine how many more judges and
supporting personnel will be needed to handle the new cases has
62.
63.

95 percent of all those who are ultimately convicted plead guilty.
Johnson, Sentencing in the Criminal District Courts, 9 HOUSTON L.
REV. 944 (1972). "You don't get a plea without a bargain and part of the
bargain is the sentence." N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
64. Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on the Judicial
Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1965).
65. Another basic flaw in the plea bargaining system is that "each
individual trial prosecutor is free to apply plea bargaining policies he considers appropriate and to change these policies from case to case." White,
A Proposal for Reform of the Plea BargainingProcess, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
439, 449 (1971). To limit the use of discretion, district attorneys could
provide prosecutors with fairly detailed guidelines of the criteria to be
applied.
66. See Burger, supra note 25, at 741. The Court in Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. at 753 (1970) recognized that plea bargaining is essential
to the effective utilization of "scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources."
However, Chief Judge Fuld, dissenting in People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418,
431, 267 N.E.2d 484, 494, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484, 494, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 927

(1971) stated "[lit is the responsibility of the State, or of its subdivisions,
to do what is necessary-by furnishing funds, facilities and personnel-to
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been ignored by state legislatures which enact laws without any
thought of their effect on the system as a whole. The New York
Criminal Procedure Law which merely increases the categories of
cases requiring pre-sentence reports is. an example of such legislation. 7 It fails to deal with the fact that over the past twenty years
increasing caseloads have already imposed a tremendous burden on
the entire criminal justice system and that plea-bargaining, the
system's major response to the caseload increase, is the primary tool
for disposing of criminal cases. Under such circumstances, the efficacy of conducting any such pre-sentence investigations after the
sentence has been promised is questionable at best."
Several suggestions for dealing with these problems have been
advanced. One would do away with the requirement for a presentence report in all cases where there has been a plea of guilty.
This proposal leaves the sentencing judge without the report and,
since its availability to him has been found to be of significance only
with regard to his possible imposition of a sentence of probation, "
we might expect the frequency of such sentences to decrease. A
result of a reduction in the number of probation sentences imposed
is an increase in the prison population together with the individual
and societal ills attendant upon incarceration that would have been
eliminated by a sentence of probation.
Another suggestion has been legislation repealing the requirement
for a pre-sentence investigation when there has been a sentence
promised prior to a guilty plea. Such a step could result in immediate sentencing in the cases where the pre-sentence report is now
assure the effective operation of the judicial system, and that burden may
not be shifted to the defendant."
67. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 390.20, Practice Commentary (McKinney
1971) cites the need for the "fullest possible information" before imposing
sentence as the rationale for the mandatory pre-sentence report. No mention is made of the effect of plea bargaining.
68. Another detrimental effect of piecemeal legislation is that its passage acts to postpone further consideration of the problem addressed. The
legislature, having considered the problem once, moves on to other issues,
and is reluctant to reconsider legislation too quickly after its adoption.
69. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text. It should also be
noted that the efficacy of the pre-sentence report is in question only when
there has been agreement on a sentence before the report is written. See
WITZTUM REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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nothing but a formality.7 1' Such legislation would constitute both an
admission that judges do involve themselves in plea bargaining,"
and an acceptance of present plea-bargaining practices. It therefore
should not be adopted without an exhaustive study to determine
what role a judge should properly play in the plea-bargaining process.72 Several of these difficult issues were discussed in the Hughes
Committee Report:
Most legal commentators declare [sentence commitment in advance of
plea] to be an undesirable practice which raises consitutional questions involving due process. . . .There are a number of reasons for keeping the trial
or conference judge aloof from the plea-bargaining process. As enumerated
by the ABA, they are: 1) judicial participation in the discussion can create
the impression in the mind of the defendant that he would not receive a fair
trial were he to go to trial before this judge; 2) judicial participation in the
discussion makes it difficult for the judge objectively to determine the voluntariness of the plea when it is offered; 3) judicial participation to the extent
of promising a certain sentence is inconsistent with the theory behind the use
of the pre-sentence investigations report; and 4) the risk of not going along
with the disposition apparently desired by the judge may seem so great to
.1
the defendant that he will be induced to plead guilty even if innocent. ....

It seems clear that any reform legislation must confront the serious question of whether conviction by negotiation should be substituted for trial by jury. Problems created by the rising crime rate,
soaring caseloads, increasing backlogs, and the need for faster dispositions cannot be solved in the long run by piecemeal legislation
directed at the pre-sentence report requirement or any other isolated trouble spot. For too long the legislatures, courts, and other
criminal justice agencies have used just such sporadic administrative, management, and legislative reforms as holding actions to
avoid confronting the breakdown of the system. Additional fragmented legislation can only serve to take the actual system further
away from the theory of criminal justice by adjudication which the
common law has developed and further alienate large segments of
the population from the belief that justice exists in the society.
What is needed is a decision for a working system, implementing the
70.

WITZTUM

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 30.

71. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 380.20 (McKinney 1971) reads: "Sentence
required. The court must pronounce sentence in every case where a conviction is entered. .. ."

72.

See HUGHES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 56, at 29.

73.

Id. (emphasis added).
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lawbook theory of criminal justice or effecting a basic change in this
theory based on a determination that the present reality of the
courts is the best system that can be developed.
Interim Solutions
It would hardly be desirable, however, for the pre-sentence process to be left as is until the desired legislative reevaluaton takes
place. Relatively minor steps might be taken in the interim to alle..
viate the problem of pre-sentence delays.
One possible means of eliminating the delays and the circularity
involved in plea bargaining is to permit defendants who have already been promised a specific sentence to waive the report and be
sentenced immediately. In considering the issue of waiver, however,
two distinct questions must be dealt with: 1) is waiver permissible
under existing law? and 2) if it is, from which interested parties
must consent be obtained in order to effectuate a valid waiver?
Presently New York case law would seem to indicate that attainment of an effective waiver without some statutory changes is unlikely.74 However, should the legislature decree that a waiver of the
74. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 390.20 (McKinney 1971) requires the preparation of pre-sentence reports in all felony cases, but is silent on the
matter of waiver. It is phrased in mandatory rather than discretionary
terms. Of course, the fact that a "court must order a pre-sentence investigation" does not, in and of itself, preclude the possibility of a waiver.
Rather, it must beascertained whether the pre-sentence report is a "right"
designed so exclusively for the benefit of a given group of people that they
can waive the right if they desire or it is, instead, a right imbued, by way
either of constitution or of statute, with a degree of overall public interest
that precludes waiver. When there has been a constitutional basis for the
existence of the right sought to be waived, New York has not hesitated in
disregarding the wishes of the individual intended to benefit from the
procedural safeguard and has rejected the purported waivers claiming such
rejection to be required by the public interest. Thus in People ex rel.
Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928), it was held: 1)
that a New York statute under which a defendant was given the opportunity to waive the state constitutional requirement for indictment by grand
jury was a nullity and 2) that the defendant could not waive the right to
indictment by grand jury. A public right, the exercise of which is basic to
the establishment of jurisdiction cannot be waived. Criminal trials involve
public wrongs and rights in which the state has an interest. The court
reasoned that consent cannot grant jurisdiction or change the mode of the
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pre-sentence report is permissible (assuming arguendo, that no constitutionally protected public interest in pre-sentence reports nulli5
fies such a legislative determination), then the second concern
becomes important-if waiver is to be by consent, whose consent is
required?
As a minimum, a clear and unequivocal waiver by the defendant
would seem a necessity, for if there were any interest intended to
be protected, it would presumably be his. In cases where no promise
of a sentence has been made or where the defendant feels probation
more likely if the information a pre-sentence report might include
were known to the judge, the defendant would naturally not consent
to waiver.
trial. Id. at 318, 164 N.E. at 112. This view was reaffirmed in Simonson v.
Cahn, 27 N.Y.2d 1, 261 N.E.2d 246, 313 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1970) where, in
sustaining an Article 78 (mandamus) proceeding, the court repeated the
message of Battista that "[Wle are not dealing with policy expediency or
convenience . . . but with fundamental rights fixed by the Constitution."
Id. at 3, 261 N.E.2d at 247, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The requirement for a presentence report, however, unlike that for a grand jury indictment, finds its
source in state statute rather than the state constitution. Thus, a presentence report is arguably not a "fundamental" right fixed by the constitution. However, in two recent cases, New York courts have held that the
public interest which precludes the defendant's right to waiver extends
beyond constitutionally prescribed procedures to those established by statute. Thus, in People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 148, 269 N.E.2d 28, 320 N.Y.S.2d
235 (1971), the Court of Appeals found that the record did not support the
contention that defendant pursuant to plea bargain had waived application of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.25(3) (McKinney 1967) which provides that,
where consecutive definite sentences of imprisonment are imposed for offenses which are committed as parts of a single transaction, the aggregate
of the terms of such sentences shall not exceed one year. The court held
that, in any event, the defendant could not waive application of the statute
even if he had so wished. 28 N.Y.2d at 151-52, 269 N.E.2d at 29-30, 320
N.Y.S.2d at 237-38. Similarly, in People v. Rosser, 36 App. Div. 2d 35, 318
N.Y.S.2d 533 (3d Dep't 1971) the appellate division rather summarily held
that a defendant could not, by consent to sentencing, waive the application
of N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 207 (McKinney 1971), which requires a
mental and physical examination for all who appear to be addicted to
drugs. 36 App. Div. 2d at 36, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 535. Together, these cases
undercut any attempt to distinguish the waiver of pre-sentence reports on
the grounds either that it is statutorily, rather than constitutionally, based
or that it does not effect jurisdiction or the mode of trial.
75. See the discussion of Battista, supra note 74.
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The consent of the sentencing judge would also be relevant and
most probably required, for he would stand as the guardian charged
with insuring the imposition of an appropriate and most likely to
be rehabilitative sentence. As the Criminal Procedure Law currently requires the probation department to make available a copy
of the pre-sentence report to any New York court or correctional
facility into whose jurisdiction or care the defendant may come,"6 it
is likely that consent from these specified individuals might also be
necessary." Parole officials represent yet another category of potential "consenters," since in some situations, the current law requires
that they too have the benefit of the report."8
Obtaining the consent of all these parties could be quite difficult
and would assumedly be time consuming. The consent of some-the
corrections officials, judges (other than the one imposing sentence),
and parole officials might, with appropriate statutory changes, be
deemed unnecessary" or procedures might be worked out to minimize administrative delays in obtaining those consents still deemed
to be necessary."' However, in view of the past and present case
law,' the prospects for evading by way of waiver the current pre76. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW §§ 390.50(2), 390.60(1) (McKinney 1971).
77. The difficulty of identifying such individuals in the relevant categories prior to sentencing is readily apparent. Any legislative revision
might include a requirement that a report is to be made available when
either the defendant or the sentencing judge feels one to be required and
thus does not consent to waiver. The sentencing judge would, for the most
part, assume the burden of determining when the information that a presentence report could provide would be relevant, not only to his own sentencing considerations but to future judicial or correctional concerns as
well. Since the defendant, by refusing consent to waiver, would also, via
the report, be afforded a chance to present to correctional officials information he considered relevant, his rights in this respect should be adequately
safeguarded.
78.

N.Y. CRIM. PRo. LAW § 390.50(2) (McKinney 1971).

79. See note 77 supra. Any interest of the parole officer (or any public
interest he represented) could, as in the case of the correction official,
presumably be protected by the sentencing judge.
80. Thus, a sentencing judge could as part of his preliminary consideration of a defendant, evaluate his sentencing options with respect to where
the defendant might eventually be incarcerated, according to the crime
charged, or existing inmate population criteria, or whatever, and thus
identify a particular correction official as one empowered to give consent.
81.

See note 74 supra.

PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS

19731

sentence report requirements do not appear especially sanguine,
unless and until there is a legislative resolution.
A more promising alternative for eliminating post-conviction delays is to begin the pre-sentence investigation at an earlier stage of
the proceedings. If the pre-sentence investigation is begun well before disposition of a case is recorded, the report can be submitted
promptly after a finding of guilt. The President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice urged that this
procedure be adopted,"2 although the Commission favored the
change primarily as a means of rationalizing the criminal justice
process rather than as a method for alleviating delays. The Commission's recommendation attempted to deal with the problems of plea
bargaining. Accepting the necessity of plea bargaining, the Commission regarded the early preparation of reports as a means of
insuring that an informed decision in line with the needs of the
defendant can be made by the prosecutor and the judge. 3 The Commission reasoned as follows:
[Plea] bargaining takes place at a stage when the parties' knowledge of their
own and each other's cases is likely to be fragmentary ....

Thus, the prose-

cutor's decision is usually made without the benefit of information regarding
the circumstances of the offense, the background and the character of the
defendant, and other factors necessary for sound dispositional decisions."
The prosecutor needs to know enough about the offender to determine
whether he should be diverted from the criminal track. Greater involvement
of court probation departments and the availability of probation officers for
consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel at this stage of the
proceedings are clearly advisable. .....1

The Commission argued that as much background information as
possible about the defendant should be used in determining the
charge to which the defendant will be allowed to plead guilty:
[A] plea bargain should be founded on the kind of information available to
82.

See THE COURTS, supra note 20, at 7.

83.

Id. at 7-8.

84.

Id. at 7.

85. Id. at 11. Prosecutors and defenders should assume more responsibility for the state of the criminal justice system. Few come to trial prepared and appellate briefs and arguments are often pathetic. The result is
that defense for indigents who depend on the state is second rate and in
most cases ineffective. See Clark, supra note 25, at 5-6. See also, N.Y.C.
BD. OF CORRECTION: LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY (1973).
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both parties that is gathered by probation departments for pre-sentence reports . . . . [P]rocedures should be adopted which would enable the parties
to call upon the probation office . . . to obtain what is in effect a pre-sentence
investigation for use in the negotiation discussion."

The Commission's assumption was that the information contained in the pre-sentence report should be influential in determining the crime with which the defendant is charged, as well as the
sentence to be offered. The Commission thus advocated a basic
change in the adjudicative system, going far beyond present pleabargaining practices. Without endorsing the Commission's view of
what the plea-bargaining system should be, its recommendation is
tendered as one means of achieving the limited goal of reducing
needless pre-sentence delay.
The efficacy of adopting this approach is questionable. On the one
hand, the idea of starting the investigation earlier allows sentencing
immediately after a finding of guilt. On the other hand, the presentence report should not be used as the basis for determining the
crime with which a defendant will be charged. Such a use is contra
to a system of criminal justice based on the theory that an individual is punished only when found to have committed a particular act
defined by law as criminal. Indeed, under present evidentiary concepts, a defendant's prior social history is irrelevant to such a finding. Therefore, as long as there exists the desire to pay lip-service
to the present fanciful concept of the operational aspects of our
system of criminal justice, then pre-sentence reports, coming by
definition after a finding of guilty, cannot a priori be used to delineate the crime itself.
The proposal to begin the pre-sentence investigation earlier in the
proceedings was considered by the American Bar Association in its
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures.7 That report
recommends that pre-sentence investigations not be undertaken
until after a finding of guilt, unless the defendant had consented
and adequate safeguards were instituted against the possibility of
prejudicing the court.88 The ABA objected to conducting an early

86. See
87.

THE COURTS,

supra note 20, at 12.

ABA

PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, § 4.2 (Ap-

proved Draft 1968).
88. Id. at § 4.2(b), Commentary.
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investigation on the grounds that it might constitute an invasion of
the defendant's right to privacy" as well as his right against self
incrimination."" The ABA was also of the opinion that the report
might prejudice the court before guilt was determined" and that it
would be economically disadvantageous to compile a report that
might never be used."
The problem of invasion of privacy, however, could be avoided by
requiring that no investigation be instituted until the defendant had
given his informed consent. As to the possibility of prejudicing the
court, a rule could be adopted whereby the report would remain in
the hands of the probation department until it was needed by the
court for sentencing. Regarding the possible increase in the number
of investigations required, it should be noted that in the past three
years approximately 87 percent of defendants indicted on felony
charges were ultimately convicted. 3 Thus, if this pattern continues
in the future, no more than 13 percent of the investigations initiated
would not be used.9 4
Vermont!' presently allows pre-sentence investigations to begin
prior to a determination of guilt. In addition, many of the federal
probation offices begin pre-sentence investigations before guilt is
established, " although not until the defense has indicated an intention to plead guilty and the defendant is fully informed of his rights.
The federal judge does not see the report until after a verdict or plea
of guilty has been entered."
The earlier involvement of the probation department in sentencing would complement the city's commitment to the establishment
of a pre-trial services agency, one charged with the responsibility of
easing the chronic overcrowding in the city's detention facilities by
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

94.

Id. at § 4.2(a), Commentary.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 12, at Table 12.
A short statistical study of those cases dismissed in supreme court

should disclose a stage in the proceedings after which very few dismissals
would occur. Investigations could then be instituted only after this step
had been reached; such a step would further reduce extra workload.
95. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 204 (1973).

96.
97.

See
Id.

RUBIN,

supra note 24, at 80.
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developing and sponsoring alternatives to money bail." By insuring
supervision and liaison with community service agencies, the pretrial services agency will attempt to secure release for those defendants not presently released because of the court's determination of
the inappropriateness of an unsupervised release on recognizance
(pre-trial parole). In addition to serving supervisory, referral, and
notification functions, the agency would have to develop and verify
a comprehensive background profile on each defendant. 9 This profile could be made the basis of the pre-sentence report. Further,
with the pre-trial services agency in operation, most of the investigative work would be done in the preliminary stages of each case.
An earlier pre-sentence investigation should substantially eliminate
the delays which now occur between conviction and sentencing.
Beginning the pre-sentence investigation before conviction is advocated here solely as a device for reducing the pre-sentence delays
which have so damaged the city's jail system. No legislation would
be required for the implementation of this recommendation. The
rights of the unconvicted defendant can be protected by rules requiring that the pre-sentence report not be released to the judge
until after conviction, as is done in the federal system. Any additional costs incurred by the increase in the number of investigations
initiated could be minimized by cooperation between probation
departments and the pre-trial services agency, and be offset by
reduced pre-sentence delays that would result in an easing of jail
population levels with their attendant costs.
This proposal is not advanced as a means of reforming the present
pre-sentence process. The questions of whether present plea bargaining practices should be continued and what role the presentence report should play in plea bargaining are reserved. This
study has raised serious issues as to the utility of the pre-sentece
report in a criminal justice system based upon plea bargaining.
What is urgently needed is a thorough review of the present system,
since the decision whether to preserve the pre-sentence investigation and report cannot be made until it is decided whether criminal
liability should be determined by adjudication or by bargain.
98. The Brooklyn Pre-Trial Services Agency began its operation in
June, 1973. N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Release No. 354-73 (June 7, 1973).
99. N.Y.C. Dir. of the Mayor's Crim. Justice Coordinating Council,
Possible New Manhattan Detention Facility (Memo., June 30, 1973).

19731

PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS
Conclusion

The recent enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law, increasing
the number of cases requiring pre-sentence investigations and reports exemplifies the piecemeal, fragmented approach which the
legislature has too long employed in dealing with the problems in
the courts. The new law was adopted with little consideration of the
resulting delays or the impact of plea bargaining-the present real-ity of the system. The problems of the criminal justice system will
not.be solved as long as the widespread practice of plea bargaining
is ignored. Rather than merely taking further legislative action to
correct the problems of the present pre-sentence process, the legislative and executive branches of the New York State government
should undertake a comprehensive review of the realities of the
criminal justice system. Such a review must determine whether plea
bargaining is both the most effective way of insuring that only those
who are in fact guilty of a specific crime are convicted and also the
most efficient means of disposing of the huge volume of cases that
flows through the criminal courts every year.
Such a study, if undertaken, would necessarily require lengthy
investigation and reflection. In the meantime, short-term measures
must be taken to alleviate the delays produced by pre-sentence
investigations. Specifically, with the informed consent of the defendant, the pre-sentence investigation should begin prior to the actual
plea of guilty. This would make it possible to have a pre-sentence
report ready almost immediately after a verdict or plea of guilty is
entered so that sentencing could follow quickly. In addition, the
legal possibility of a defendant's waiver of the report should be
expanded since waiver would eliminate many superfluous presentence reports prepared after a sentence has already been promised.
Most informed observers agree that New York City's criminal
justice system is near collapse. It is very important, therefore, that
consideration of short-term solutions not delay the more important
priority-a detailed review of the functioning of the entire criminal
justice system and a decision as to the best way of adjudicating
criminal charges against individuals.
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TABLE II: EFFECT OF USE OF VERA REPORT ON DISPOSITION PATTERNS
BY TYPE OF LEGAL COUNSEL*
PRE-SENTENCE REPORT

Actual

Sentence

Legal Aid

Private Attorney

No.

Percentage

No.

Percentage

Prison
Non-Prison

118
36

77
23

12
48

20
80

Total

154

100

60

100

VERA REPORT

Prison
Non-Prison
Total

*SOURCE:

J. LIERERMAN,

No.

Percentage

No.

Percentage

127
67
194

65
35
100

18
41
59

31
69
100

A.

SCHAFFER

&

J. MARTIN, THE BRONX SENTENCING PROJECT OF THE

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENT IN THE USE OF SHORT-FORM PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS
FOR ADULT MISDEMEANANTS

(1971).

SHORT FORM PRESENTENCE REPORT
Defendant

FL

La

Age

M

Date of Birth -_Mo._DayYr.
Mo.
Day

-

Convicted of

Yr.

P. L. §

Custody Status:

Bail (

)

0

R.O.R.

Jail Time Credit

Jail 01

As of

Counsel
Original Charge

Date of Arrest

Other Charges Pending (including probation and parole violations):
Charge

Prior Record:

Court/Agency

Adult 0

Arrests

Juvenile 0

None 0

Convictions

JD/PINS ADJUDICATIONS

-

No,

Status

No.

No.

Most Recent Other Offenses

Disposition

Date of Disp.

(Attach Fingerprint Sheet for Additional Items)
Address

Street

Apt. No.

Time at Present Address

City/Village/Borough

Addresses Past 2 Yrs.

No.
Resides With

Marital Status

Number of Children
Provides Support (or care) for

Age Range

Occupation

Wage $
Per Wk.

Present Employer
Last Two Years:

How Long
Amount of Time Unemployed

Employers
No.

Yr.-Mo.

Other Source of Support
Education: Highest Grade

Special Training/Skill
Current Education/Vocation/Other Program
Military:

Draft Status ____

Branch

Youthful Offender:
Eligible 0
Certificate of Relief from Disabilities:
INFORMATION VERIFIED:
Address

Military

Age -

-

Prior Record____

Education __

-

Date ____

Ineligible E0

Other Charges Pending

Present Employment

-

Type of Dis.

-

Required 0
Elgible 0

Vocation/other Program

Comments on Verification:

-

NAME:

(Docket) (Indictment) #

DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT OFFENSE
CODEFENDANTS
(Name)

(Status)

EVALUATION
RECOMMENDATIONS

(OPTIONAL):

Youthful Offender:

Yes

-

Certificate of Relief From Disability: Grant -

SENTENCE:

Unconditional Discharge 01 Conditional Discharge 0 Fine 0
Special Conditions:
Date Prepared:

Signed:

No____
Refuse -

Probation Officer

Approved:
Director/Supervisor

Probation Case #:

Sentence and Date:
FIG. 1

Defer_

Probation ] Commitment 0

